Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications
2012

What is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of
Defining 'Medical Necessity' and 'Essential Health Benefits' Under
the Affordable Care Act
B. Jessie Hill
Case Western University School of Law, jessie.hill@case.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Hill, B. Jessie, "What is the Meaning of Health? Constitutional Implications of Defining 'Medical Necessity'
and 'Essential Health Benefits' Under the Affordable Care Act" (2012). Faculty Publications. 81.
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/81

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

American Journal of Law & Medicine, 38 (2012): 445-470
© 2012 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics
Boston University School of Law

What Is the Meaning of Health?
Constitutional Implications of Defining
“Medical Necessity” and “Essential
Health Benefits” Under the Affordable
Care Act
B. Jessie Hill†

I. INTRODUCTION
When the government decides to assume a major role in providing and paying
for healthcare, the government also has to decide exactly what constitutes
appropriate, reasonable, or essential healthcare under its program. Congress, of
course, recognized this necessity when it passed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA), and the statute itself provides authority to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine the “essential health benefits”
that must be covered under the ACA beginning in 2014, both by insurers offering
plans within governmentally sponsored exchanges and on the individual and smallemployer markets outside the exchanges.1 In a decision that was hailed as both
“politically astute” and problematic for the goals that the ACA itself was supposed
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Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(b)(1), 124 Stat. 119,
163-64 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§§ 1302(b)(1), 2707(a) (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A § 18022(b)(1) (West 2012)). This Article refers
to the consolidated act, with amendments, as the “ACA.” See also generally John K. Iglehart,
Defining Essential Health Benefits—The View from the IOM Committee, 365 NEW E NG . J. M ED. 1461,
1461-62 (2011) (describing the “essential health benefits” requirement imposed on insurance
companies within and outside the exchanges).
1
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to accomplish,2 HHS shunted off the task of defining the term “essential health
benefits” to the individual states.3
The states’ authority to choose a package of essential benefits for their citizens
is not totally open-ended, of course. States will be required to specify a “benchmark
plan” within parameters specified by HHS, to which other approved plans must be
“substantially equal.”4 In addition, every package of essential benefits must
encompass ten different categories of benefits that have been specified in the ACA
itself, and nondiscrimination norms apply.5 Nonetheless, states end up with
considerable discretion under what appears to be a political compromise.
Needless to say, the crafters of this plan were aware of the intensely fraught
nature of any attempt to define the essence of “health,” “healthcare,” or “medical
necessity.”6 Such decisions affect the lives and choices of the individuals covered by
regulated insurance plans, as well as the bottom line of the insurers themselves. The
breadth and precise nature of the ACA’s requirements will directly affect the Act’s
ability to meet its stated goals of providing comprehensive coverage for the vast
majority of Americans and controlling healthcare costs.7 And in certain domains—
particularly reproductive healthcare—the decision to include or exclude a particular
service may carry political consequences and implicate value choices in a way that is
particularly salient. In August 2011, for example, substantial controversy
accompanied HHS’s decision to adopt the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM)
recommendation that all new private health plans must, under the ACA, cover the
full range of contraceptive options along with other preventive care for women.8 The
debate became more heated when the Obama Administration announced its intention
to maintain this requirement with only a very limited “conscience clause,” which
exempts organizations that have religious objections to contraception but which is
too narrow to cover some entities, such as hospitals and universities, that are
operated by those religious groups.9 While some condemned the administration’s

2
See, e.g., INST . OF MED., E SSENTIAL HEALTH B ENEFITS: B ALANCING C OVERAGE AND C OSTS xi
(2011) (describing the major goals of specifying essential health benefits as “balancing the
comprehensiveness of benefits with their cost”); Sarah Kliff, What Counts as ‘Essential’ Health
Care? White House Tells States to Decide, WASH . POST (Dec. 16, 2011, 2:51 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/what-counts-as-essential-health-care-whitehouse-tells-states-to-decide/2011/12/16/gIQAzOAmyO_blog.html (describing some commentators’
concerns that comprehensiveness of coverage may be sacrificed in the interests of cutting costs).
3
C TR. FOR C ONSUMER INFO . & INS . OVERSIGHT , DEP ’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., E SSENTIAL
HEALTH B ENEFITS B ULLETIN 8 (2011), available at http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/
12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf.
4
Id. at 8, 12.
5
Id. at 10; see also ACA § 1302(b)(1).
6
See, e.g., INST . OF MED., supra note 2, at 8-5.
7
Id. at xi.
8
See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive
Services Under the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,626 (Aug. 3, 2011) (amendments to be codified at
45 C.F.R. pt. 147) (announcing the interim final rule regarding coverage of preventive health
services); Women’s Preventive Services: Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, HEALTH
R ESEARCH & SERVS. ADMIN ., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2012);
Steven Ertelt, Pro-Life Groups, Catholic Bishops Blast Obamacare Recommendations,
LIFE NEWS. COM (July 19, 2011, 5:58 PM), http://www.lifenews.com/2011/07/19/pro-life-groupscatholic-bishops-blast-obamacare-recommendations/ (noting opposition to the pre-amended rule from
groups such as Americans United for Life, the Family Research Council, and the Catholic bishops).
9
Press Release, A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius, U.S. DEP ’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2012pres/01/20120120a.html (last revised Feb. 2, 2012) [hereinafter Sibelius Statement]

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2070945
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decision as an assault on religious freedom, HHS cast its determination in terms of
protecting women’s health.10
This controversy highlights the extraordinarily hazy contours around the
definition of health in a variety of legal and policy contexts and the significance of
that definition for future debates surrounding the ACA. While acknowledging that
numerous social, economic, and public health consequences may attach to the
definition of medical necessity, this Article focuses primarily on the constitutional
issues that may arise, depending on how broadly or narrowly the government defines
concepts such as “medical necessity” and “essential health benefits.” At first glance
it may appear that, beyond the debate about the constitutionality of the individual
mandate, a governmental benefit program like the ACA is not likely to give rise to
claims that an individual constitutional right has been violated. This Article
speculates, however, that the unprecedented and expansive role of the government in
directing individuals’ healthcare portended by the ACA may provoke a re-evaluation
of some apparently settled constitutional principles. While acknowledging the wide
scope of constitutional rights that may become implicated, this Article focuses on
one right in particular—the so-called “negative right to health.” It argues that the
negative right to health may be directly and substantively affected by governmental

(announcing that HHS’s final rule will remain the same as the interim rule). The rule (in both its
interim final form and final form) makes available an exemption from the contraceptives coverage
requirement for employers who meet the following requirements:
(1) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the organization.
(2) The organization primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the
organizations.
(3) The organization serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the
organization.
(4) The organization is a nonprofit organization as described in [those portions of the
Internal Revenue Code pertaining to churches and their “integrated auxiliaries”].
Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under
the ACA, 76 Fed. Reg. at 46,626. Most, if not all, Catholic hospitals and Catholic colleges and
universities would fail to meet all of these requirements. For example, most hospitals could not be
considered to have the “inculcation of religious values” as their primary aim, and neither Catholic
hospitals nor universities generally employ or serve primarily those who share their religious beliefs.
As of the time of publication, the Obama Administration had announced its intent to further modify
the rule so as to accommodate religious employers who would not meet the narrow requirements for
exemption. According to a White House fact sheet, the new accommodation would ensure that
“[r]eligious organizations will not have to provide contraceptive coverage or refer their employees to
organizations that provide contraception,” and they would not be “required to subsidize the cost of
contraception.” Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: Women’s
Preventive
Services
and
Religious
Institutions
(Feb.
10,
2012),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/10/fact-sheet-women-s-preventive-services-andreligious-institutions. Instead, coverage for contraceptives will be offered by the employers’ insurance
companies directly, and without cost, requiring no involvement by those religious employers who
oppose contraception.
10
Compare Amanda Terkel, Newt Gingrich Condemns Obama Administration’s Contraception
Rule, Calls It a ‘War Against Religion,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 30, 2012, 12:10 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/30/newt-gingrich-obama-contraception-rule_n_1241655.html
(noting the view of some conservatives that the contraception coverage rule constituted an assault on
religion), with Sibelius Statement, supra note 9 (stating that the rule “will ensure that women with
health insurance coverage will have access to the full range of the Institute of Medicine’s
recommended preventive services” and noting that “[s]cientists have abundant evidence that birth
control has significant health benefits for women and their families, is documented to significantly
reduce health costs, and is the most commonly taken drug in America by young and middle-aged
women”).
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specification of essential health benefits, particularly if those benefits are defined in
a way that excludes services that may be considered medically necessary.
Part II of this Article provides background. That Part begins by describing the
ways in which the Affordable Care Act, supplemented by the work of the IOM,
defines concepts such as “medical,” “medical necessity,” and “essential health
benefits.” Part II then provides a brief, non-exhaustive overview of the ways in
which courts and commentators have struggled to define a related constellation of
concepts surrounding health and healthcare in various other legal contexts. Part III
then turns to the “negative right to health,” beginning with an explanation, in Part
III.A, of what is meant by the “negative right to health” and arguing, succinctly, for
its existence. Briefly, the negative right to health is a constitutional entitlement to
protect one’s health by making medical treatment decisions without excessive
government interference.11 As explained in greater depth below, this right may be
inferred from case-law touching on reproductive rights, the right to refuse medical
treatment, and related issues. The negative right to health has been described in great
depth elsewhere;12 consequently, in this Article, both the description and the defense
of the right are somewhat cursory. Part III.B then examines two significant
limitations on possible arguments that the ACA infringes on the negative right to
health: the state action doctrine and the subsidy/penalty distinction. Finally, Part
III.C considers whether any constitutional claims pertaining to the definition of
medical necessity under the ACA might survive under existing precedent. Even if no
claim is likely to exist under current doctrine, this Article suggests that the eventual
expansion of the government’s role in healthcare decision-making under the ACA
may one day provoke a reconsideration of that precedent.
II. THE DISPUTED NATURE OF “HEALTH”
Political wrangling over the meaning of “health” recently took place in Ohio,
when voters overwhelmingly passed an “anti-Obamacare” amendment to the state
constitution.13 The ballot initiative, known as the Ohio Healthcare Freedom
Amendment, sweepingly provided, with limited exceptions, that “[n]o federal, state,
or local law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or
health care provider to participate in a health care system,” nor “prohibit the
purchase or sale of health care or health insurance,” nor “impose a penalty or fine for
the sale or purchase of health care or health insurance.”14 By its terms, the
amendment applied only to laws passed after March 19, 2010.15 Ironically, in light of
the essentially conservative base of voters that supported the amendment, the first
healthcare regulations to appear vulnerable were several abortion-related laws
passed by the Ohio legislature in that same year, including a post-viability abortion
ban, a ban on purchasing abortion insurance through the state-sponsored exchange to
be created under the ACA, and a proposed ban on all abortions after the fetal

11
B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 C OLUM . J. GENDER & L. 501,
527 (2009) [hereinafter Hill, Reproductive Rights].
12
See, e.g., sources cited infra note 100.
13
See, e.g., Aaron Marshall, State Issue 3 Won’t Have a Big Impact on Health Care in the Short
Term, Experts Say, C LEVELAND . COM , (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/
2011/11/state_issue_3_wont_impact_new.html (noting that the amendment passed by a margin of two
to one).
14
OHIO C ONST . art. I, § 21(A)-(C).
15
Id. § 21(D).
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heartbeat could be detected.16 Reproductive rights advocates in Ohio pointed out that
such laws prohibited the purchase and sale of healthcare and were therefore
vulnerable to constitutional challenge under the new amendment.17 Supporters of the
Healthcare Freedom Amendment, hoping to keep in place the sorts of abortion
restrictions that were recently passed in the state, responded that the Ohio legislature
could avoid this conundrum simply by making it clear that abortion does not fall
within the definition of “healthcare.”18 It is unclear, of course, whether the
legislature will be able to change the impact of the Ohio Constitution by defining
“healthcare” in a particular way through ordinary legislation; but this anecdote
demonstrates, at a minimum, the absence of a clear definition of the term, as well as
the essentially political nature of the determination of what is and is not healthcare.
These two facets of the definition of “health” and “healthcare” are discussed at
greater length below.
A. MULTIPLE DEFINITIONS
There are multiple, but related, concepts concerning “health,” all of which are
relevant to the operation of the ACA, and there is no consistent or clear set of
definitions for them. In each case, attempts to define concepts such as “medical
necessity” and “essential health benefits” founder on circularity, or simply refer the
matter to other entities to decide. As a general matter, “medical necessity,” a key
term in insurance companies’ coverage decisions, usually refers to the medical
appropriateness of a particular intervention in a particular case or type of case.19
“Essential health benefits,” by contrast, is a term associated with the ACA and refers
more broadly to the types of healthcare that must be covered under insurance plans,
such as preventive office visits and “medically necessary” treatments for various
types of conditions.20 Thus, “medical necessity” is a more case- or condition-specific
concept, whereas “essential health benefits” refers more generally to the categories
of coverage under a benefits plan. These terms are, of course, intimately related
insofar as they address the question of what constitutes the sort of healthcare to
which individuals can claim some form of statutory or contractual entitlement. At
the same time, they remain vague at their core.21
Numerous questions remain unanswered by the various attempts to define these
terms. For example, how severe must the harm or pain be, before the need for
medical treatment is recognized? Is the term “health” narrowly limited to physical

16
H.R. 78, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (enacted); H.R. 125, 129th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (not yet enacted).
17
Joe Guillen, Gov. John Kasich Signs 13 Bills into Law, Including Another Anti-Abortion
Measure, C LEVELAND . COM (Dec. 21, 2011), http://www.cleveland.com/open/index.ssf/2011/
12/gov_kasich_signs_13_bills_into.html.
18
Marshall, supra note 13.
19
See, e.g., M. GREGG B LOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC M YTH : WHY DOCTORS ARE UNDER PRESSURE
TO R ATION C ARE , P RACTICE P OLITICS, AND C OMPROMISE THEIR P ROMISE TO H EAL 11 (2011)
(describing “medical necessity” as “the legal standard for health insurance coverage in the United
States and throughout much of the world”); INST . OF MED., supra note 2, at xii; cf. id. at 2-5
(distinguishing “medical necessity” and “essential health benefits”).
20
See ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 119, 163-65 (2010) (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 18022(a)-(b)); see also INST . OF M ED., supra note 2, at 4-2 to 4-3 (discussing the meaning
of “essential”).
21
See, e.g., B LOCHE , supra note 19, at 11 (characterizing the term “medical necessity” as “a
malleable notion, more of a euphemism for physician habit than a scientific yardstick”).
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health, or does it include mental health, emotional health, and social well-being? Is
reproductive care an aspect of healthcare? And which persons or entities—doctors,
patients, insurers, legislatures, regulators, or judges—are or should be empowered to
make the final decision regarding medical necessity? Though an exhaustive study of
the multiple contexts in which these issues arise is beyond the scope of this Article,
Part II.A provides a sample of some of the ways in which courts and commentators
have struggled with the various axes of defining “health,” “medical necessity,” and
“essential health benefits.”
1. The ACA and the Institute of Medicine Report
Prolix though it is, the ACA itself contains very little in the way of explanation
or definition of key concepts such as “medical,” “medical necessity,” and even
“essential health benefits.” Section 1302 of the ACA lays out the ten categories of
coverage that constitute the “essential health benefits” required for new health plans
under the ACA.22 Beyond that, however, the ACA provides no more guidance and
instead delegates to the Secretary of HHS the authority to define “essential health
benefits.”23 The ACA contains no explicit definition of “medical necessity,” nor
does it explicitly distinguish “medical” from “nonmedical” interventions.24
The task of defining key concepts thus largely falls on HHS. Prior to the HHS
decision to allow states to define essential health benefits on their own, the IOM
issued (at the request of HHS) a lengthy consensus report entitled Essential Health
Benefits: Balancing Coverage and Costs, in which it attempted to grapple with some
of the complexities described above.25 The report noted, first, the difficulty of
distinguishing “medical” from “nonmedical” interventions.26 After acknowledging
that “the boundaries of what is medical and nonmedical are not always distinct,” and
noting the additional difficulty that the ACA requires some coverage of
“habilitation” services, which often have a social or educational component,27 the
report simply recommended allowing the decision about the distinction between
medical and non-medical to be made by individual health plans, “with oversight by
state regulators and HHS.”28
Similarly, the IOM report noted the multiple existing definitions of “medical
necessity.” Again dispensing with the necessity of fixing one particular definition for
the term, the IOM report embraced the view that “[t]he central question is whether
the treatment is medical in nature and whether the individual can be expected to

22
ACA § 1302(b)(1); see also id. § 1301(a)(1)(b) (defining a “qualified health plan” as one that
provides “essential health benefits”); id. § 2707 (requiring insurers on the small group and individual
markets to provide “essential health benefits” as defined in the ACA). The ten required categories of
coverage under the ACA are “[a]mbulatory patient services,” “[e]mergency services,”
“[h]ospitalization,” “[m]aternity and newborn care,” “[m]ental health and substance use disorder
services, including behavioral health treatment,” “[p]rescription drugs,” “[r]ehabilitative and
habilitative services and devices,” “[l]aboratory services,” “[p]reventive and wellness services and
chronic disease management,” and “[p]ediatric services, including oral and vision care.” Id.
§ 1302(b)(1)(A)-(J).
23
Id. § 1302(b)(1).
24
The ACA does define “emergency medical condition” for various purposes, however. See, e.g.,
ACA §§ 2707(h)(1), 2719(b)(2)(A).
25
INST . OF M ED ., supra note 2.
26
Id. at 4-19 to 4-20.
27
“Habilitation” is defined in the IOM report as “distinct from rehabilitation, in that it is
designed to help a person first attain a particular function, versus restoring a function.” Id. at 4-4.
28
Id.
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medically benefit from it”—thus referring back to the very term (“medical”) that it
had earlier declined to define.29 The report essentially deferred the task to private
insurers, who have substantial experience in defining medical necessity, while
emphasizing the values of “individualizing care, ensuring value, and having medical
necessity decisions strongly rooted in evidence.”30 Thus, the IOM report stated that
services meeting the requirements of medical necessity will be those that are “(1)
clinically appropriate for the individual patient, (2) based on the best scientific
evidence, taking into account the available hierarchy of medical evidence, and (3)
likely to produce incremental health benefits relative to the next best alternative that
justify any added cost.”31 The report also noted that patients’ rights would be most
fully protected through the requirement of an “independent external review” that
“will begin de novo and will be binding on the insurer” in cases where medical
necessity is disputed.32
Of course, the IOM report’s emphasis on medical benefit, functionality, and
medical purpose would seem to clearly exclude certain types of procedures—those
generally denominated as cosmetic, for example. Yet, even this apparently bright
line admits of some fuzziness. For example, would a procedure such as breast
reconstruction after surgery for removal of a tumor,33 or microtia repair for a child
born without an outer ear34—two procedures that are regularly covered by
insurance—fall within this definition? 35
2. International Law
Of course, outside the immediate context of the ACA, there have been other
attempts to define “health” and “medical necessity.” Efforts to define and delimit an
international right to health, for example, have necessarily struggled with the
question of what constitutes a minimum required level of healthcare for all.36 Health,
in the international context, is understood broadly. Thus, descriptive efforts often

29

Id. at 5-26.
Id. at 5-28.
31
Id.
32
Id.; see also ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2719(a)-(b), 124 Stat. 119, 887-88 (2010) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19(a)-(b)) (requiring availability of internal and external review
processes for coverage determinations).
33
Health insurance plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
currently must cover post-mastectomy breast reconstruction. 29 U.S.C. § 1185b(a) (2006).
34
Microtia is a congenital condition, in which children are born with a partial or no external ear
formation. Microtia repair generally adds no functionality. See June K. Wu, Outer Ear Construction:
Is Advocacy Part of Treatment?, 12 VIRTUAL M ENTOR 367, 369-70 (2010), available at
http://virtualmentor.ama-assn.org/2010/05/pdf/ccas2-1005.pdf (describing microtia and noting that
insurance companies sometimes decline to cover one or more stages of microtia repair); Microtia
C OSMETIC
SURGERY
AT
THE
UNIVERSITY
OF
VIRGINIA,
Repair,
FACIAL
http://www.cosmeticuva.com/html/services/microtiaRepair.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2012) (noting that
repair of the external ear does not improve any hearing loss associated with the original birth defect,
and stating that insurance generally covers microtia repair).
35
Cf. ACA § 9017 (defining “cosmetic surgery and medical procedure” as a procedure that is
“performed by a licensed medical professional” and “not necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising
from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a persona injury resulting from an accident or
trauma, or disfiguring disease”) (superseded by id. § 10907(b)).
36
See, e.g., Virginia Leary, The Right to Health in International Human Rights Law, 1 HEALTH
& HUM . R TS. 24, 25 (1994); Anika Rahman & Rachael N. Pine, An International Human Right to
Reproductive Health Care: Toward Definition and Accountability, 1 HEALTH & HUM . R TS. 401, 40506 (1998) (noting that “[i]nternational organizations and scholars have made several attempts to
provide content to the right to health” and to describe its minimum “core content”).
30
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hearken back to the World Health Organization definition of “health” as “a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity.”37 For example, General Comment 14 to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights defines the “right to health” as
“embrac[ing] a wide range of socio-economic factors that promote conditions in
which people lead a healthy life, and extends to the underlying determinants of
health, such as food and nutrition, housing, access to safe and potable water and
adequate sanitation, safe and healthy working conditions, and a healthy
environment.”38
Such definitions may be critiqued on many grounds: for starters, they are quite
vague.39 More importantly, perhaps, it is wildly aspirational to suggest that any
constitutional, statutory, or human rights-based right to health could encompass the
swath of services that would be required to achieve such a state of health in any
enforceable way.40 Consequently, although a number of constitutions that were
adopted after the mid-twentieth century, under the influence of human rights law,
recognize a right to health, the content of that right often remains undefined. For this
reason, the definitional struggle may shift to determining when a minimum core of
required health services has been provided, or on whether a government is moving
sufficiently toward the progressive realization of such a state of health for all
citizens.41
3. Constitutional Law—Reproductive Rights Cases
Although American law has not explicitly recognized a positive right to health,
U.S. courts have had occasion to address the meaning of health and medical
necessity in other contexts. In particular, significant litigation has surrounded the
meaning and effect of the requirement, derived from the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Roe v. Wade42 and Stenberg v. Carhart,43 that abortion regulations must not
endanger a woman’s health and that even restrictions on post-viability abortions

37
Constitution of the World Health Organization, Preamble, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 186
[hereinafter WHO Constitution].
38
U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard
of Health: General Comment No. 14, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (Aug. 11, 2000); see also Lance
Gable, Reproductive Health as a Human Right, 60 C ASE W. R ES. L. R EV . 957, 979-81 (2010); Eleanor
D. Kinney, The International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and
World?, 34 IND . L. R EV. 1457, 1467-68 (2001) (describing the “broad and inclusive” right to health
outlined in General Comment 14).
39
See, e.g., Rahman & Pine, supra note 36, at 406.
40
See, e.g., Leary, supra note 36, at 28 (“Superficially, the ‘right to health’ seems to presume
that government or international organizations or individuals must guarantee a person’s good health.
This interpretation is obviously absurd and the phrase is not given such an interpretation in the context
of human rights law.”).
41
See, e.g., Soobramoney v. Minister of Health 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) (applying the South
African right to health, but holding it did not require the state to provide dialysis treatment to the
plaintiff); Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U. C HI. L. R EV. 519,
527-32 (1992) (discussing the difficulties that some countries experience in implementing a right to
health); cf. 241/2001 Purohit & Moore v. The Gambia, Commc’n No. 241/2001 (Afr. Comm’n on
Human & Peoples’ Rights 2003) (noting the state’s obligation “to take concrete and targeted steps” to
realize the right to health “while taking full advantage of its available resources”).
42
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
43
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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must give way when the woman’s health is at stake.44 Thus, it may be useful to
consider how, if at all, abortion case-law has defined health and medical necessity.
Unfortunately, those concepts are never very well defined in this line of
jurisprudence. One issue is whether reproductive healthcare can properly be
considered an aspect of healthcare in general, or whether it must be treated as a
unique category. Doe v. Bolton,45 the companion case to Roe v. Wade, speaks of
abortion itself as being, at least in part, a medical decision that should be treated like
other medical decisions.46 Indeed, those opinions have been criticized by feminist
scholars for the extent to which they treat abortion as a matter of medical judgment,
to be placed in the hands of the physician, even to the exclusion of the agency and
judgment of the woman herself.47 Thus, the Court in Roe claimed to “vindicate[] the
right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling
justifications for intervention.”48 Until the point of viability, when the state’s interest
in the fetus becomes compelling, the Court explained, “the abortion decision in all
its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility
for it must rest with the physician.”49 Similarly, the Court in Doe compared the
abortion procedure to other surgical procedures, noting that the Georgia statute at
issue in that case regulated abortion in ways that were unimaginable for other
surgeries.50 It further underlined the importance of the physician’s medical judgment
in determining the appropriateness of abortion in an individual case.51
In addition, the Doe Court addressed the scope of the concept of “health.” It
considered the advisability of abortion, as medical procedure, to be a calculation that
takes into account not only the woman’s health concerns, but also her well-being in
a more holistic sense—including “physical, emotional, psychological, [and] familial
[factors], [as well as] the woman’s age.”52 Doe thus views health as a broad concept,
touching on not only physical health but also mental, emotional, and social factors.
This definition of health may even recall the World Health Organization’s definition
of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not
merely the absence of disease or infirmity.”53
Interestingly, moreover, the decision regarding medical need for the abortion
procedure appeared to be one that should be made primarily by the doctor, rather
than by parties external to the doctor-patient relationship. Indeed, this understanding
of the doctor’s role also seemed to play a role in the legislative debates in the 1970s
over the reauthorization and scope of the Hyde Amendment, which generally
prohibits the use of Federal Medicaid funds for abortions, with very limited
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exceptions.54 While some Senators attempted to broaden the subsidy to include not
only life-saving abortions but also those that were “medically necessary,” supporters
of the broadening language, citing Doe v. Bolton, noted that the change would thus
“leave it to the woman and her doctor to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.”55
Although Doe’s broad definition of “health” did not appear to carry much
influence in subsequent decision-making, the concept of the maternal “health
exception,” introduced in Roe, became a central point of contention over the
definition of “medical necessity.” In particular, Roe held that even at the point of
viability, when the state has a compelling interest in the life of the fetus, the state’s
interest must give way when the woman’s life or health is at risk. Yet, the Court
must mean something different by “health” in this context than when it talks about
abortion as an aspect of healthcare in general. In other words, in the post-viability
context, protecting “health” apparently refers, in a more narrow way, to something
like freedom from harm—and probably significant harm. It seems to have an
affiliation to the concept of self-defense, as it permits the woman, essentially, to
protect herself when she is threatened by the pregnancy.56 It is an open question
whether mental health threats, as opposed to threats to the woman’s physical health,
are sufficient to trigger the post-viability abortion exception.57 Thus, this constricted
definition of “health” may be contrasted with the more general concept of
“healthcare,” or perhaps even interventions having a “medical purpose.” Those
terms contemplate a more holistic view of health, as a state of overall well-being and
the object of autonomous decision-making about how to take care of one’s body.
Gonzales v. Carhart and Stenberg v. Carhart,58 the Supreme Court’s two
“partial-birth abortion” cases, contain the most significant discussions of health as
medical necessity in the abortion context. In both Stenberg and Gonzales, the
Supreme Court considered whether laws banning a procedure referred to as “partialbirth abortion” were unconstitutional because they lacked a health exception that
would allow the procedure to be performed when it is safer for the woman than other
available procedures. Gonzales and Stenberg are particularly germane to the concept
of medical necessity. Precisely stated, the issue before the Court in both cases was
whether the state can, consistent with the Constitution, force a woman to have a
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legally permissible abortion by means of a procedure that her doctor believes is
riskier for her than another available procedure.59 The Court held in Stenberg that
this was in fact unconstitutional. In so doing, it seemed to have recognized, in part, a
sort of medical self-defense right, involving an understanding of medical necessity,
in the abortion context, as freedom from state-imposed harm.
Moreover, the Court arguably clung to the same concept of health in Gonzales v.
Carhart, even though the case itself came out the other way and upheld a federal
partial-birth abortion ban that lacked a health exception allowing the procedure to be
performed when necessary to avoid health risks to the woman.60 The opinion took
issue neither with the notion that women have a right to avoid harm to their health
resulting from a government-imposed abortion restriction, nor with the notion that
this particular regulation (a ban on this particular abortion procedure) may in some
circumstances impose significant health risks on a particular woman.61 Rather, the
Supreme Court turned away the latter challenge, because it felt that, in light of the
allegedly conflicting medical evidence before it, the existence vel non of those risks
should be considered in the context of an as-applied challenge rather than the facial
challenge that the plaintiffs had brought.62
Thus, despite their differences, both Gonzales and Stenberg seemed to view the
health exception as preventing harm to the woman’s health in the form of significant
risks; whether that includes only physical risks or possibly also mental health risks is
unclear. But at the same time, the cases differ in terms of who is entitled to
determine how best to avoid harm to the woman’s health. The Stenberg Court,
having determined the possibility of health risks, appeared content to leave it largely
to the woman and her doctor to decide whether and when the procedure is medically
necessary and appropriate.63 The Gonzales Court, to say the least, was more
skeptical: it seemed to see some role for the legislature in defining what procedures
may and may not be medically necessary, and it was unwilling to adopt an acrossthe-board health exception that would essentially delegate decisions about medical
necessity to the individual physician.64 Instead, the Gonzales Court saw a need for
continuing involvement by the government—including, perhaps the courts, which
would be charged with further specifying when the procedure was or was not
necessary to protect a woman’s health.65
4. Constitutional Law—Eighth Amendment Cases
Another area of constitutional law in which medical necessity may be
implicated is case-law examining prisoners’ rights to adequate medical care under
the Eighth Amendment.66 Prisoners, who are at the mercy of the state for medical
care, are entitled to a certain level of healthcare provided by the state; the state’s
failure to provide that level of care may give rise to a claim for a violation of the
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Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.67 The Supreme
Court has made it clear that the standard under the Eighth Amendment is a
demanding one, requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate the government’s “deliberate
indifference” to the prisoner’s “serious medical needs.”68
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted this standard to mean something more serious
than “routine discomfort” must be present; moreover, the failure to provide
treatment must be likely to “result in further significant injury or the ‘unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain.’”69 The Ninth Circuit’s standard encompasses “an
injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of
comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects
an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.”70
Similarly, several other circuits define a “serious medical need” as “one that has
been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that
even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”71 It
seems clear that this definition includes mental health needs.72 This definition does
not, of course, describe the level of services that must be provided in response to
medical need;73 it does, however, provide a description—much like that found in
Gonzales and Stenberg—of when medical necessity exists and the right to medical
treatment is triggered.74
5. Summary
This brief survey of judicial and non-judicial attempts to define terms such as
“health” and “medical necessity” for legal purposes has resulted in a widely
divergent set of concepts.75 On one pole are definitions, such as those found in the
Eighth Amendment and “partial-birth abortion” contexts, that are narrowly
concerned with protecting an individual’s physical and perhaps mental well-being
from severe, state-imposed harms. Those definitions might relate most closely to the
concept of medical necessity. On the other pole are definitions, such as those in the
human rights context and in Roe and Doe, that recognize health as a broad concept
and medicine as a holistic practice, affecting not just physical and mental well-being
in the strictest sense, but also the individual’s social state. Arguably, this latter
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definition plays a role in the ACA’s concept of “essential health benefits” as
including “habilitation,” which has a clear social element. Finally, it is important to
recall that medical necessity is, on the ground, often defined simply as that which is
likely to bring more benefit than harm for the patient—or at least enough so to
justify the cost.76
Of course, it is not entirely surprising that decision-makers reach different
definitions of the constellation of concepts such as “health,” “medical necessity,”
and “essential health benefits,” given the wide variety of contexts in which the terms
are used and the multitude of different purposes for which they are mobilized. It is
entirely reasonable that medical necessity might be defined more narrowly by a
court deciding about women’s access to a particular method of later-term abortion,
but more broadly by a document that sets forth entitlements of a comprehensive
government benefit program. The protean nature of the term is nonetheless
noteworthy—and perhaps more importantly, as this Article argues below, it may
prove to be constitutionally problematic.
B. THE POLITICS OF “HEALTH”
Commentators have acknowledged the fraught nature of this definitional
undertaking. Indeed, the IOM report on essential health benefits itself states that “the
determination of the EHB [essential health benefits] is a politically and socially
charged endeavor.”77 The concepts of healthcare and medical necessity implicate
particularly thorny debates when they are invoked in relation to volatile issues such
as women’s reproductive healthcare. Moreover, because of its ill-defined and
inherently malleable nature, the concept of medical necessity is often a mask for
decision-making that is primarily based on non-medical grounds, including moral
judgments, as well as more mundane concerns about value and cost.
In a recent book, Professor Gregg Bloche argues that judgments about “medical
necessity” are often a covert form of healthcare rationing by insurance companies.78
Insurance companies, being naturally unable or unwilling to pay for all of the
healthcare that may be desired by a consumer or a physician, must make judgments
about what they will and will not pay for. They thus make decisions about allocation
of healthcare dollars and resources based on judgments—often reasonable but not
always transparent—not about the beneficial or non-beneficial nature of the
treatment at issue, but rather about whether the cost is justified by the additional
“quality-adjusted life years” saved.79
In some unusual but highly salient cases, political judgments have infected
medical decision-making in a very direct way. Bloche points to such examples as the
Bush administration’s attempts to minimize payments for mental health services to
veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder by influencing the frequency
with which the condition was diagnosed.80 But more generally, he argues, “[a]ll
medical diagnosis is political,” in that it “defines personal characteristics—signs and
symptoms—as both undesirable (‘pathological’) and beyond the scope of one’s
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personal responsibility.”81 Labeling something as a medically treatable pathology,
Bloche explains, “mobilizes social resources (public and private insurance) . . . , and
it excuses people from myriad social obligations.”82 Examples of the political
content of medical diagnoses abound. One need only think of the appearance and
disappearance of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders as an identified mental illness, or of the controversy over whether
deafness should be thought of as a sometimes-treatable disability or as a cultural
characteristic to be embraced.83 Bloche also points to the movements to label obesity
or short stature as conditions requiring medical intervention.84 In the former case,
labeling obesity as a disease rather than a sign of personal weakness or a lifestyle
choice involves judgments about culture, personal responsibility, and even free
will.85 Likewise, treating short stature as a medical condition involves making
certain judgments about the importance of aesthetics, the relevance of social wellbeing to “health,” and the role of hardship in building individual moral character.86 It
is, simply put, impossible to judge whether a symptom is unusual or pathological
without some reference to what is normal, and it is impossible to determine
normalcy without some reference to social, cultural, and moral values.87
The definition of “health” is also political in the sense that, in an age of rising
costs and limited funds, it unavoidably involves judgments about the proper or fair
allocation of scarce resources. Indeed, one commentator has characterized as “[t]he
doctor’s dilemma” the inevitable tension between defining necessary or appropriate
care in terms of the “primacy of patient welfare” and ensuring the equitable
allocation of healthcare resources.88 Comparing the American healthcare system to
those of countries in which healthcare is universal but supported by a limited,
defined budget, Victor Fuchs argues that the latter is a superior way of ensuring
physicians act as stewards of those healthcare resources.89 “In short,” he asserts,
“when physicians are collectively caring for a defined population within a fixed
annual budget, it is easier for the individual physician to resolve the dilemma in
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favor of cost-effective medicine. That becomes ‘appropriate’ care.”90 In other words,
the necessity of taking cost into account is inherent in the enterprise of medicine,
and this political dimension of the undertaking cannot be avoided by simply
delegating the decision-making to a multitude of private actors—namely, patients,
doctors, and insurance companies.
Perhaps the most obviously politicized area of healthcare, however, is
reproductive healthcare. Debates have long raged, and continue to rage, over the
respective roles of patients, physicians, legislators, regulators, and judges in
reproductive decision-making, and American society currently lacks consensus over
the role of reproductive health services within the broader statutory and contractual
entitlements to healthcare. Indeed, long before the furor erupted over the Obama
administration’s recent announcement that it would require most private insurers to
cover prescription contraceptives, courts and commentators debated whether
contraceptives were part of healthcare and whether insurers’ refusal to cover them
constituted sex discrimination.91 One Washington district court, considering an
employer’s argument that contraceptives are not healthcare because pregnancy is not
a disease, asserted that “the availability of affordable and effective contraceptives is
of great importance to the health of women and children because it can help to
prevent a litany of physical, emotional, economic, and social consequences.”92 Thus
embracing a broad understanding of health that stretches beyond mere physical wellbeing, the court added: “Identifying and obtaining an effective method of
contraception is a primary healthcare issue throughout much of a woman’s life and
is, in many instances, of more immediate importance to her daily healthcare situation
than most other medical needs.”93
Similarly, debates have persisted over whether abortion constitutes a form of
healthcare, and, if so, what sorts of medical or other factors may be taken into
account by those making the abortion decision. In particular, there is longstanding
disagreement over the nature of “therapeutic” abortion, as the political controversy
over “partial-birth” abortion and the resulting divided Supreme Court opinions
demonstrate.94 Yet, one study of hospital abortion committees, which were charged
with deciding when therapeutic abortions would be permitted in the decades prior to
Roe v. Wade, indicates that the politically charged nature of the issue goes back
much further than the late-1990s.95 The debate among physicians over medical
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indications for abortion was characterized by widespread internal disagreement and
“reflect[ed] broader cultural attitudes toward women, mothers, babies, and
pregnancy in the postwar era.”96 Indeed, arguably, the permissibility of therapeutic
abortion to preserve the woman’s life or health turned into a requirement imposed
upon the doctor “to make sure that the woman stayed moral,” rather than that she
stayed healthy, by policing the reasons that entitled the woman to an abortion.97
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND CONSTITUTIONAL SPECULATION
Even if the project of defining medical necessity is riddled with uncertainty and
contestable political judgments, however, it is not automatically entwined with
constitutional concerns. It may be politically, economically, or ethically problematic
to define “medical necessity” in a particular way—in general, or in an individual
case—but that does not make it unconstitutional.
There are, however, several respects in which a government program regulating
healthcare might implicate individuals’ constitutional rights. A governmental choice
to deny certain important healthcare to individuals as medically unnecessary,
without notice or an opportunity to contest the finding, might constitute a violation
of procedural due process.98 A decision to permit some individuals but not others to
access a particular form of healthcare could also implicate the Equal Protection
Clause.99 In addition, a decision by the government to criminalize or otherwise take
certain forms of safe and effective healthcare off the table completely may implicate
substantive due process rights, or the so-called “negative right to health.” This last
one is the focus of this Article.
There are two barriers to recognizing constitutional claims of individuals
seeking healthcare under the ACA, however. First, it is difficult to locate state action
in the context of decisions about coverage and medical necessity that will be made
primarily by private insurers rather than state actors. Second, the Act is in large part
a governmental spending program—a subsidy, rather than a direct regulation of
individuals’ healthcare options. Existing precedent clearly establishes that the
government may choose to subsidize some things and not others, and that the failure
to subsidize the exercise of a constitutional right is not the same as imposing a
penalty on the exercise of that right.
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A. THE NEGATIVE RIGHT TO HEALTH
Several scholars, including myself, have postulated the existence of a sort of
“negative right to health.”100 In a 2007 article, I suggested that there was a doctrinal
thread running through the Supreme Court cases dealing with access to reproductive
healthcare, refusal of medical treatment, and even mandatory vaccination suggesting
that individuals have a constitutional right to protect their health.101 This right,
moreover, may include a right both to refuse care and to access care—not at
government expense, but without government interference.102 Drawing on the case
law and scholarship indicating that there is a “freedom of health” that encompasses,
to some extent, a right to access medical treatment without government interference,
Professor Abigail Moncrieff has also argued that “[a]s an aspect of general bodily
autonomy, the freedom to reject care has gained formal recognition in a handful of
cases, and as a necessary element of reproductive rights, the freedom to obtain
treatment has been an important, though informal, player in several cases.”103
The requirement of a health exception for prohibitions on post-viability abortion
is perhaps the most obvious example of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the
negative right to health. From Roe v. Wade onward, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the government may regulate and even prohibit abortions after the fetus is
viable, but it must make exceptions for abortions that are “necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.”104
Professor Eugene Volokh has argued that the right to a post-viability health
exception represents a right that is separate from the abortion right itself—a right to
“medical self-defense.”105 Although this right has not yet been extended to other
contexts, “the right can’t logically be limited to situations in which the defensive
procedure is abortion and rejected,” for example, “when a woman needs to defend
herself using experimental drugs or an organ transplant.”106
Indeed, several Supreme Court cases recognizing the necessity of a “health
exception” to abortion regulations seem unexplainable except by reference to such a
right.107 In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,108 for
example, the Supreme Court emphasized that states cannot regulate abortion in such
a way as to impose health risks on the woman, nor can it force a trade-off of the
woman’s health against the fetus’s.109 This is the case, the Court held, even if the
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fetus is viable—that is, even if the state’s interest in potential life is compelling.110
Indeed, the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart echoed the Thornburgh holding when it
decided that a state ban on a particular abortion procedure was unconstitutional if the
permitted procedure was riskier to the woman’s health in a given case.111 Indeed,
Stenberg is a particularly strong example of the negative right to health because it
involves the question of whether the state can require a particular procedure for an
abortion that will take place in any case. It is, fundamentally, not a case about the
circumstances under which the state can act to protect potential life, but rather about
how the state can regulate surgical procedures in ways that impact a woman’s health
and bodily integrity. Moreover, although the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart cut back
in several respects on the scope and enforceability of the right at issue in Stenberg,
the Gonzales Court nonetheless preserved the essential holding that government
regulations of abortion methods—and, presumably, a fortiori of any other surgical
techniques—are unconstitutional if they impose substantial health risks on the
woman.112
Outside the abortion context, the Supreme Court has recognized a related right
to refuse medical treatment.113 In addition, it implied in Jacobson v. Massachusetts
that, while the government may impose compulsory vaccination requirements, that
requirement, too, must be subject to a health exception if it would be harmful to the
health of a particular individual.114 And lower courts have occasionally drawn on
substantive due process doctrine to find that individuals possess a right to access
particular forms of healthcare, such as acupuncture115 and experimental cancer
drugs.116 At the same time, numerous courts have also denied the existence of a
constitutional right to access particular medical interventions.117 As several
commentators (including myself) have argued, however, there is a logical and
doctrinal basis for asserting that substantive due process protects, at least to some
extent, the right of individuals to access medical care to protect their health.118 There
is, in other words, a negative right to health.
Of course, “[t]o recognize that individuals possess a constitutional right to
protect their health by making autonomous medical treatment decisions is not, by
any means, to decide that the right is a trump card and that states are powerless to
withhold drugs from the market, regulate the practice of medicine, or prosecute
quacks;” it is simply to say that a fundamental right is implicated by regulations
affecting individual healthcare choices and that such regulations must be subject to
heightened scrutiny.119 Moreover, although there is a firm basis for suggesting that a
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negative right to health has been recognized within abortion jurisprudence, and that
that right logically extends to other contexts, there is no clear basis for delineating
the scope of that right. The negative right to health, which has not even been
recognized as such by the Supreme Court, has no clear contours. It is therefore
difficult to say what sort of state-imposed harm or what degree of state-imposed
harm is likely to violate that right. “Health,” in this context too, lacks a clear
definition.
To summarize, there is arguably a negative right to health that has been
recognized in American constitutional jurisprudence—though perhaps not
consistently or explicitly so—that subjects government action to heightened scrutiny
when it takes certain healthcare options off the table. Such constitutionally
problematic regulations may include not only those that force individuals into
unwanted medical treatment but also those that interfere with individuals’ access to
safe and appropriate medical treatment. Those precedents do not, however, suggest
that the government is constitutionally required to subsidize individuals’ medical
care. Nor have they drawn a clear line as to what sorts of health risks are
problematic.120 In other words, they have not, as illustrated in Part II, given a clear
interpretation of the meaning of “health” or “medical necessity” for a particular
treatment.
B. PENALTIES, SUBSIDIES, AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
The ACA, of course, famously requires individuals to carry health insurance.121
It also imposes certain mandates on private employers and insurance companies that
almost indisputably benefit individual consumers. Further, the Act expands
Medicaid eligibility, thus increasing the number of Americans whose healthcare will
be provided by the government.122 It does not, however, directly regulate
individuals’ healthcare options. Most individuals will continue to carry private
insurance provided by their employers, or purchased on the open market or through
state-sponsored insurance exchanges.123 Given that the government is not directly
involved in the contractual relationship between individuals and their private
insurers or physicians, and therefore that state action is lacking, it may, at first
glance, be difficult to see how constitutional claims could arise for those individuals.
The government’s regulation does not prevent anyone from accessing the healthcare
that they may need or desire if they can pay for it with their own funds, nor does it
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prevent insurance companies from offering benefits above and beyond the minimum
essential health benefits, for those consumers who wish to purchase additional
coverage.
Even for those individuals who carry Medicaid, constitutional arguments are
difficult to come by. As the Supreme Court held decades ago—in cases involving
access to abortion, a form of healthcare—there is a difference between a failure to
subsidize a constitutional right, which does not constitute a violation of that right,
and a penalty on the exercise of a constitutional right, which may constitute a
violation. As the Court held in Maher v. Roe124 and Harris v. McRae,125 when the
government chooses to subsidize childbirth but not abortion—even “medically
necessary” abortions—with Medicaid funds, neither the woman’s right to equal
protection nor her substantive due process right to choose abortion is violated.126
The woman’s right to choose abortion, and possibly her negative right to health,
would be implicated if the government had instituted a total prohibition on
therapeutic abortion, rather than a simple funding ban. Thus, as the Court explained
in Maher, “[t]here is a basic difference between direct state interference with a
protected activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts to
impose its will by force of law; the State’s power to encourage actions deemed to be
in the public interest is necessarily far broader.”127 Analogizing to another
constitutional right—the right to direct the education of one’s children—the Court
explained that it had never held that the Constitution “established a ‘right of private
or parochial schools to share with public schools in state largesse,’” and observed
that “[i]t is one thing to say that a State may not prohibit the maintenance of private
schools and quite another to say that such schools must, as a matter of equal
protection, receive state aid.”128 Thus, even assuming—as argued above—that direct
regulation of individuals’ healthcare choices may implicate constitutional
substantive due process, the failure to subsidize certain healthcare choices through a
federal spending program generally does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation.129
For those Americans whose insurance will be regulated by the ACA but not
directly provided by the government, it appears equally difficult to argue that
constitutional rights may be implicated by the government’s decision-making
regarding essential health benefits and medical necessity, for at least three reasons.
First, the ACA’s decisions regarding medical necessity and essential health benefits
impose mandates on insurers, not on individuals. The individual mandate aside, the
ACA does very little to direct or constrain individual citizens’ healthcare choices.
Second, the ACA acts primarily to impose mandates—in the form of minimum
requirements—on insurers. These mandates, unlike restrictions on care, tend to
benefit consumers by requiring that they have access to a certain level of healthcare
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services, while leaving insurers free to cover a broader range of services if they
wish. Finally, and relatedly, the ACA does not purport to dictate which forms of
healthcare individuals may purchase with their own funds. There is little evidence,
therefore, of the sort of governmental coercion or entanglement in individual
healthcare decisions that would be required to invoke constitutional protections.
Professor Abigail Moncrieff has nonetheless offered an innovative analysis that
suggests one way in which constitutional questions may well arise. In her article,
The Freedom of Health, she raises the question of whether the ACA’s individual
mandate might violate the negative right to health found guaranteed by the right to
substantive due process.130 Although this Article does not focus specifically on the
individual mandate, Moncrieff’s analysis and conclusion are relevant to the
argument presented in this Article.
Considering the implications of the individual mandate for the freedom of health
(or in my terminology, the negative right to health), Moncrieff astutely observes:
[Insurance] contracts give insurers . . . discretion under “medical
necessity” review to decide whether their insured can buy various
kinds of health care with the pool’s money. That is, insurance
companies today use their contracts to steer individuals towards certain
health care consumption decisions, often refusing to cover treatments
that they deem ineffective, unnecessary, or even just inordinately
costly. . . . If she is required to buy into such a contract, a patient will
give up some degree of freedom and autonomy to choose her own care;
at a minimum, she will lose some freedom to direct the care that she
purchases with the dollars that she has set aside in insurance.131
Thus, Professor Moncrieff concludes, the requirement of submitting oneself to this
sort of medical necessity review—and the reality that most individuals will not be
able to access healthcare if their insurance will not pay for it—means that the
government is, at the very least, burdening consumers’ rights to choose the care they
deem appropriate or necessary to protect their own health.132 This could (but
according to Professor Moncrieff, is not likely to) rise to the level of a violation of
the constitutional freedom of health.133
Though my analysis diverges from Professor Moncrieff’s somewhat, I agree
with her approach in finding the potential for state action through the ACA’s
subjection of individual healthcare choices to government-sponsored medical
necessity review. Indeed, the point can be made even more strongly: though
conducted by individual insurers, the medical necessity review under the ACA is
required by and governed by the federal law. The ACA incorporates, in a sense, the
private insurers’ decision-making and thereby arguably requires those decisions to
conform to constitutional norms and requirements.
Still, several critiques may apply to this line of analysis. First, even recognizing
that the medical necessity decision-making by private insurers is guided by and
required by the ACA, it is not entirely clear that this level of governmental
involvement is sufficient to constitute state action for constitutional purposes.
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Indeed, the state action inquiry is notoriously amorphous.134 Thus, the Supreme
Court has held that simply operating pursuant to a state license and in compliance
with a state regulatory scheme does not constitute state action.135 Instead, for a
private individual or entity to become a state actor, his conduct must be entwined
with the state or his business in symbiotic relation with the state.136 The mere fact of
government regulation—even admittedly extensive government regulation—of
private insurers most likely does not transform those insurers into state actors,
according to current state action doctrine.
Moreover, even in the absence of the ACA’s individual mandate requirement,
individuals’ healthcare choices are subject to their ability to pay or to locate private
insurance. There is no indication, as of yet, that the ACA imposes on private insurers
any stricter “medical necessity” limitations than they already impose on their own
consumers—and indeed, so far the Obama Administration has demonstrated an
intent to maintain the status quo by embracing the existing system of private
decision-making. It is difficult to see how replication of the status quo can suddenly
constitute a burden on a fundamental right.
Additionally, individuals remain free to purchase healthcare with their own
money. The ACA’s mandates thus do not restrict individuals’ healthcare choices,
just as the Hyde Amendment’s prohibition on using Medicaid funds for abortions
theoretically leaves Medicaid recipients free to access the procedure on their own.137
It is true that individuals generally cannot access medical care that their insurance
chooses not to cover, and therefore that their negative constitutional right to access
care may be, in practical terms, nonexistent. But again, this is true whether or not the
government requires individuals to carry insurance. As the Court emphasized in
Maher, the Constitution is not implicated when the individual’s own indigence,
rather than government-imposed obstacles, prevent her from accessing care.138
C. THE POSSIBILITY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION OF THE NEGATIVE RIGHT TO
HEALTH UNDER THE ACA
This Article proposes a way in which constitutional requirements may still come
to play a role in the future under the ACA. Over the long term, the new role assumed
by the federal government in healthcare will likely have two specific effects. First,
there will eventually be a massive expansion of the number of individuals who are
covered by government healthcare plans.139 Second, there will be an increased
regulatory role for the federal government in private insurance plans, as the statesponsored exchanges take on greater and greater significance vis-à-vis healthcare
coverage that is obtained in other ways, such as through private employers.140
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Though not certain to occur, there is reason to believe that both outcomes are likely,
and possibly intended, long-term effects of the healthcare reform.
As the government’s role as both provider and regulator of healthcare becomes
more important and extensive, there will be less room for private insurers to make
their own decisions about coverage and medical necessity. Even in the absence of
direct federal mandates pertaining to coverage, private insurers will most likely
come to offer, almost exclusively, plans that meet the requirements of the
exchanges, and it would not be surprising if determinations about medical necessity,
made under standards set forth by the government and subject to external review,
become somewhat uniform on a national level. Indeed, many would see such a result
as desirable.141 The government’s definition of essential health benefits may thus
become both a floor and a ceiling.142 Indeed, as some health policy analysts have
argued in a similar context, “if certain types of products are excluded in certain large
markets,”—such as Medicaid or even simply the exchange-approved plans, which
may exclude certain benefits because they are not required to offer them—“over
time the market as a whole for a product can be expected to shift, as manufacturers
move to accommodate their product to reflect the regulated design.”143 It may, for
example, be more efficient for insurers to design all insurance plans so that they
meet the minimum requirements—and only the minimum requirements—of a
particular state’s definition of essential health benefits. In addition, since essential
health benefits are defined in part by what certain large, “benchmark” plans choose
to cover,144 insurers may well end up dictating the content of those essential benefits
across states.
It may be reasonable to believe that at some point, the government’s role in the
healthcare marketplace will become so significant that the government cannot be
treated as one actor among many private actors, free to subsidize or deny subsidies
to various activities as it chooses. Instead, the government’s role as healthcare
provider and regulator may be analogized to that of a government speaker who so
dominates the marketplace with its own message that it crowds out almost all private
speech. At such a point, many commentators agree, constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech would be implicated by the actions of the government speaker.145
So, too, might the negative right to health become implicated if the government so
dominates the healthcare market that private decision-making about medical
necessity becomes essentially impossible. In other words, at such a point in time,

141
Jennifer Prah Ruger, Fair Enough? Inviting Inequities in State Health Benefits, 366 NEW E NG.
J. MED . 681, 682 (2012) (arguing that differences in state-mandated health benefits will result in
inequalities and that, instead, everyone should “have access to the same high-quality goods and
services” in accordance with principles of medical necessity, “within the scope of national
standards”).
142
See, e.g., Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit
Standardization and Regulatory Choice Under the Affordable Care Act, 74 ALB . L. R EV . 241, 266
(2010) (suggesting that “[t]he general rule of ‘federal floor, not state ceiling’ may be tested in the area
of health benefits”).
143
SARA R OSENBAUM ET AL., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUPAK /PITTS
AMENDMENT FOR COVERAGE OF M EDICALLY INDICATED ABORTIONS 5 (2009), available at
http://www.gwumc.edu/sphhs/departments/healthpolicy/dhp_publications/pub_uploads/dhpPublication
_FED314C4-5056-9D20-3DBE77EF6ABF0FED.pdf.
144
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
145
M ARK YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 158-73 (1983); Steven Shiffrin, Government
Speech, 27 UCLA L. R EV. 565, 595 (1979).

468

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 38 NO. 2&3 2012

one might wonder whether the distinction between government subsidy and
government burden remains tenable and meaningful.
Thus, as Mark Yudof has suggested in the government speech context, although
the government may have particular interests in speaking in various contexts, a
functional First Amendment analysis would have to consider the possibility that
government will distort the marketplace of ideas (and hence individuals’ thinking
about an issue), as well as “the degree to which the government has captured the
audience,” among other factors.146 In the healthcare context, advocates might one
day argue that the government has imposed a distorted set of healthcare options on
an essentially captive audience.
Indeed, a similar issue arose in Canada, in the case of Chaoulli v. Québec.147 In
Chaoulli, the plaintiff challenged a Québec law prohibiting private insurance and
requiring individuals to carry only public insurance. The law meant that individuals
were forbidden to pay out-of-pocket for health care they desired. In a 4-3 decision,
the Canadian Supreme Court held that this legislation was unconstitutional. Though
there was no majority rationale, the two majority opinions saw the regulation as
impermissibly interfering with individuals’ right to seek healthcare to protect
themselves from bodily harm.148 Though such a scenario—a prohibition on all
private insurance—is certainly not contemplated by the ACA,149 the extensive
degree of government involvement in providing and regulating health insurance that
may eventually occur due to the ACA could have greatly similar effects.
Finally, this theory is connected to the problem of defining health and medical
necessity—and in particular, for defining those terms for constitutional purposes. As
noted above, although the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the meaning
of “health” and “medical necessity” in the abortion context, in cases that appear to
implicate the negative right to health to a greater or lesser degree, it has not arrived
at a settled definition. It has drawn on broader and narrower definitions, suggesting
sometimes that the right to make medical treatment decisions broadly includes the
right of patients to decide autonomously and in consultation with their physicians on
appropriate treatment, and at other times intimating that the only right at issue is a
narrow one to avoid significant state-imposed health risks or serious state-imposed
physical harm.150 To date, the Supreme Court has not decided a substantive due
process case relying on an explicit and general negative right to health. Its strongest
and most detailed discussions of the issue appear in the abortion jurisprudence. As
the ACA expands the role of the government in providing and regulating
individuals’ healthcare, however, and as the negative right to health may come to
take on more prominence for a wider swath of Americans, the definition of health
will take on more significance.
Though many medical interventions may remain uncontroversial, some will
certainly raise political concerns, and some decision-making might implicate the
right to protect one’s health. For example, a decision not to cover bariatric surgery
for obese individuals may implicate the right to health. Such a claim obviously
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depends on viewing obesity as a disease rather than a lifestyle choice, and on
showing that bariatric surgery is “medically necessary.” It immediately becomes
clear, therefore, that the definitions of “health” and “illness,” as well as “medical
necessity,” with all their cultural and political dimensions, will be implicated in such
a claim. Similarly, coverage for arguably cosmetic procedures such as microtia
repair may become another flashpoint.
While it appears that the ACA will not extend coverage requirements to
therapeutic abortion, in any form, any time soon,151 the theory set out in this Article
may well give reproductive rights advocates new ammunition for attacking this sort
of line-drawing. If the ACA’s regulatory impact is so extensive that it essentially
terminates the market for private insurance for medically necessary abortions,
plaintiffs may well have an argument that this new burden is more substantial and
more constitutionally significant than the burden of Medicaid non-subsidy, which
the Supreme Court dismissed in Maher v. Roe and Harris v. McRae.152
Other issues may arise in the reproductive health context as well. For example,
it is conceivable that states could outlaw coverage for prenatal genetic testing or
counseling, on the theory that it is likely to lead to abortion.153 Another imaginable
scenario is that insurance companies will decline to provide coverage for vaginal
birth after a first child is born through caesarean section.154 If governmental
regulations end up making these safe and legal medical services unavailable for all
intents and purposes, courts may one day decide that women’s rights to procreative
autonomy and bodily integrity are implicated.
Finally, medical marijuana may also become the subject of negative right to
health claims. Several states have legalized its use, when sanctioned by a doctor’s
diagnosis and supervision.155 Though cannabis is not currently approved by the
FDA, and therefore is not generally covered by insurers, it is plausible to suggest
that constitutional issues might be raised, eventually, if the federal regulations either
forbid coverage for cannabis, or result in private insurers’ refusal to cover it.156
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has not aimed to define the term “health,” of course, but simply to
sketch out some of the important constitutional questions that may turn on such a
definition. The nature and extent of individuals’ right to protect their health under
the Constitution may pertain to a wide variety of healthcare choices and,
particularly, whether individuals have a right to a wide range of healthcare options,
or only to resist governmental decisions that take the safest and most efficient
options off the table. It will impact whether social and cultural factors may be taken
into account, or only narrowly defined “medical” ones.
At a minimum, the possibility of a new constitutional claim for violation of the
negative right to health may have one positive effect. The existence of such a claim
may force the debate about the meaning of “health” out of the shadows and into a
more deliberative forum. That forum would of course be the courts, which may or
may not, however, be the ideal place for it.157 Indeed, though little is certain about
where the debate will end up, it seems clear that the government will not be able to
avoid the issue forever.
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